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Martin Westlake (Brussels)
Why Presidencies Still Matter
Eine der Neuerungen des Vertrages über eine Verfassung für Europa wäre die Schaffung einer permanenten
Ratspräsidentschaft. Eine weniger beachtete Bestimmung des Vertrages betrifft die Fortführung der
traditionell rotierenden Präsidentschaft für alle Ratsformationen mit Ausnahme des künftigen Rates für
Äußere Angelegenheiten. In der Praxis sind die meisten Bestimmungen in diesem Zusammenhang bereits
stillschweigend durch Änderungen der Geschäftsordnung des Rates implementiert worden. Dieser Beitrag
untersucht, warum selbst in einer Union mit 27 oder mehr Mitgliedsstaaten die traditionelle Präsidentschaft,
mit ihrer Rotation alle sechs Monate (gruppiert in 18-monatigen Partnerschaften), immer noch eine
wichtige Rolle spielt. Er schließt Überlegungen an, warum die traditionelle Rolle der Präsidentschaft,
insbesondere hinsichtlich ihrer Koordinationsfunktion, sogar noch an Bedeutung gewinnen würde, wenn
eine permanente Ratspräsidentschaft eingeführt würde.
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1. Introduction
John Kerr, Secretary General of the Euro-
pean Convention, recently argued that, if the
Constitutional Treaty were to be cherry-picked,
one of the five most important ‘cherries’ would
be a permanent presidency for the European
Union. Another, he suggested, would be a sin-
gle EU foreign affairs representative, straddling
the Council and the Commission (Kerr 2007).
It is indeed true that the Constitutional Treaty
(European Union 2005) would have established
such a permanent presidency and foreign affairs
representative. In particular, Articles 22 and 24
provided for a president of the European Coun-
cil and a Union minister for foreign affairs. Kerr
went on to argue that, in a 27+ Union, it would
take so long for a member state’s six month
‘turn’ at the Presidency to come around again
that there would be little advantage to be had
from continuing the practice. Curiously, how-
ever, the Constitutional Treaty did not do away
with the rotating presidency – on the contrary;
Article 24 effectively preserved a largely un-
changed version of it for all Council formations
except the putative Foreign Affairs Council.
Indeed, some observers have criticised the
Constitutional Treaty’s provisions on the Coun-
cil Presidency for being an uncomfortable com-
promise between current practice and the de-
sired efficiency.
John Kerr’s implicit argument would appear
to be that, precisely because the Council presi-
dency matters, the old rotating presidency
should be done away with. But there is another
way of looking at the particular provisions of
Article 24. What the draftsmen of the Constitu-
tional Treaty seemed to be declaring was that
the rotating presidency mattered and should
continue to matter, notwithstanding the Union’s
continued expansion. Is this a convincing posi-
tion? What is clear is that, whether the Consti-
tutional Treaty is revived or not, some form of
the presidency is likely to be with the Union for
a long time to come. The rest of this article will
test the arguments against and for the proposi-
tion that presidencies still matter. It will then
consider the provisions on the presidency set
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out in the Constitutional Treaty and the extent
to which, in effect, some of these have already
been implemented. The article will conclude
with a consideration of some of the potential
tensions that would be created by full imple-
mentation of the Constitutional Treaty’s provi-
sions.
2. Why presidencies don’t matter
(any more)
It could be argued that the Council will al-
ways require presidencies of one form or an-
other and so, therefore, presidencies will always
matter. However, this article will mostly focus
more narrowly on a particular common under-
standing of the term ‘presidency’ in the Union
context – that is, the six-monthly rotating presi-
dencies taken in turns by the member states. So,
taking this particular definition of the term, why
don’t presidencies matter any more?
In the first place, successive waves of en-
largement have undermined many of the argu-
ments about the benefits of the six-month rotat-
ing presidency. In a Community of six, a mem-
ber state would wait only three years before its
turn came again. In a Community of twenty-
seven, the wait is some fourteen years. By the
time a member state’s turn comes again, many
of the argued benefits of running a presidency
– socialisation, familiarisation, and so on – will
surely be diminished. Moreover, since all Eu-
ropean Council meetings are now held in Brus-
sels, what used to be a major perceived benefit
of the Presidency – showcasing a European
Council meeting in a major city – no longer
applies. The same mostly goes for sectoral
Council meetings – though informal ministerial
meetings are another matter.
In the second place, the increasing complex-
ity of the presidency and its sheer onerousness
(particularly for smaller, less well-resourced
member states) has led to a diminution in the
presidency’s ‘pure’ responsibilities. A number
of Council preparatory bodies have elected
chairmen. The Council secretariat’s role in chair-
ing certain working parties has been consoli-
dated, as has the practice whereby succeeding
presidencies take on chairing responsibilities
during the preceding presidency. A number of
developments have compounded this dilution
in the ‘purity’ of presidency responsibilities. An
increasing number of policy processes (co-de-
cision legislative procedures, for example), if
not the majority of them, go beyond any six-
month period and, in any case, the Council’s
new multi-annual planning mechanisms, com-
bined with the Commission’s ever-tighter leg-
islative planning, greatly reduce the scope for
presidency initiatives. A variation on this argu-
ment is that there is nothing new. For example,
John Wyles, a seasoned ‘Brussels’ observer,
recently pointed out that ‘(e)very presidency’s
agenda is largely dictated by the near perma-
nence of many challenges (economic moderni-
sation, energy policy, etc.)’ (Wyles 2007).
In the third place, in the specific field of for-
eign policy, there has been growing recognition
of the need for something more permanent than
a six-month flit across the world stage. (And
implicitly, an understanding that the EU’s for-
eign policy has to be represented with more
weight than a micro-state – a Malta, a Luxem-
bourg, or a Cyprus – could possibly provide, no
matter how weighty its intentions and expertise,
though the example of Jean-Claude Juncker and
Luxembourg more generally demonstrate that
even micro-states can punch above their weight.)
Two other arguments are traditionally ad-
vanced against the rotating presidency. A first
is against the principle of rotation itself, on the
grounds that this is unnecessarily disruptive and
undermines continuity and consistency. The sec-
ond concerns the six-month period, which is
considered to be simply too short.
3. Testing the arguments
It is undeniably true that fourteen or more
years is a long time to wait for a brief period in
the sun, but how strong is this argument as a
reason for doing away with the rotating presi-
dency altogether? After all, we know intuitively
that the presidency mattered enough to the 25
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then signatory states of the constitutional treaty
for them to enshrine it in the new treaty’s provi-
sions. Perhaps the strongest counter-argument
is bound up in the basic ethos of an equitable
Union of sovereign states. Fulfilment of presi-
dential duty will always remain a badge of re-
sponsibility and honour. Moreover, it redounds
to the good image of a member state – both its
self-image and external reputation – both as a
Union ‘player’ and as a mature European Un-
ion nation state, to acquit its presidential duties
well. These arguments carry particular weight
with new member states and even greater sym-
bolic value for recent democracies; exercising
the presidency represents a subliminally impor-
tant consolidation of their new status and au-
thority. (See The Economist, 18 November 2006,
for an analysis of Slovenia’s forthcoming presi-
dency, for example.) The rotating presidency,
with its implicit equality among the member
states, is also a powerful symbolic assertion of
what has come to be called the ‘community
method’.
A second strong counter-argument is that the
presidency remains a club, and one where all
members have the same status – both in terms
of benefits, challenges and membership charges.
No matter how distant the prospect, the club’s
members all know that one day, and if only for
a limited period, they will have to put the com-
mon good before their own narrower interests.
The future prospect necessarily affects their
current behaviour, on a variation of the theme
that ‘there, but for the grace of God, go I’.
Moreover, there is mutual understanding among
the club’s members about the costs, as well as
those fabled benefits, of managing a modern
presidency. As Confederate General Robert E.
Lee said, ‘It is well that war is terrible, or we
should grow too fond of it.’ In the same way, a
dose of the presidency experience could, it might
be argued, last for fifteen years just as easily as
three! In the same context, it could be argued
that a longer wait before assuming the presi-
dency brings hidden advantages: there is a lesser
burden on the exchequers of individual mem-
ber states (presidencies are a very expensive
indulgence!) and maybe the remoteness of the
prospect will help to concentrate minds and
ambitions.
It is similarly undeniable that the modern day
presidency is a vast and complex affair. Indeed,
a modern presidency performs a veritable gal-
axy of tasks, some set out in the treaty, some set
out in the Council’s rules of procedure, some
set out in European Council conclusions and
many others the cumulative result of customary
practice. A modern presidency is at one and the
same time manager, promoter, package-broker,
honest broker, representative to and from the
other Community institutions, spokesman for the
Council and the Union and an international ac-
tor. For smaller member states in particular the
work load would simply be overwhelming, but
the member states’ response has not been to do
away with the presidency but, rather, to devise
ways of sharing the load and helping one an-
other – a response which logically follows from
the basic ethos described above.
Few would deny that presidencies are far less
autonomous than was the case fifteen or twenty
years ago but, again, such a diminution in ‘pure’
responsibilities is not necessarily a reason for
doing away with the presidency altogether. On
the contrary, the fact that successive presiden-
cies now tread onto a well-oiled conveyor belt
of legislative and procedural planning under-
mines the argument that presidencies can no
longer cope. The same reasoning applies to
lengthy legislative procedures (conciliation) or
multi-presidency preparatory processes, as it
does to the rise in the importance of the Coun-
cil’s secretariat (which does not imply a dimi-
nution in the importance of the presidency).
What, then, about the arguments that there
is nothing new in the Union and that there is
little space for fresh initiatives? There is mani-
fest truth in the proposition that many of the
challenges facing the Union are long term or
cyclical. On the other hand, even where this is
the case fresh approaches or new lines of attack
can be championed by a presidency. The 2000
Portuguese presidency and the establishment of
the Lisbon Strategy is a good example. An in-
dicative example is provided by a recent aca-
demic assessment of the Finnish Presidency in
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the second half of 2006 (Tiilikainen 2007). One
page was devoted to external relations chal-
lenges but, equally, one page was devoted to
‘widening and deepening’, another to the Euro-
pean Union’s legislative agenda, and another to
the presidency’s relations with the other institu-
tions. A much more recent illustration was the
German presidency’s focus, at the March 2007
European Council meeting, on the issue of cli-
mate change. Presidencies can also bring their
own administrative style and concerns to the
role. Here, a good recent example was provided
by the 2006 Finnish presidency’s proposal to
cut 2000 administrative posts from the Euro-
pean Union’s overall administration. A brief
perusal of each successive presidency’s record
will inevitably reveal examples of this kind.
Lastly, a presidency is always prey to the unex-
pected (‘Events, dear boy!’ as Harold Macmillan
apocryphally replied when asked what could
upset a government’s programme.) – and not
necessarily in the field of diplomacy alone.
As to arguments against the principle of ro-
tation, a strong additional counter-argument is
that the rotation is itself a valuable part of the
exercise. Like a team in a relay race, practising
passing the baton is a vital part of training; a
presidency is also judged by how well it picks
up and passes on processes and procedures. A
good current example concerns the future of the
Constitutional Treaty, where the German, Por-
tuguese and Slovenian presidencies have con-
certed their planned efforts in such a way that
matters should reach their head towards the end
of the 2009 French presidency, which will co-
incide with the next round of elections to the
European Parliament. More modest examples
are constantly occurring, particularly in the leg-
islative field, where successive presidencies till
the soil, sew the seeds and reap the harvest in a
sort of collective legislative husbandry.
The duration of the presidency was, mean-
while, the focus of some debate during the in-
ter-governmental conference preceding the sign-
ing of the Constitutional Treaty. Interestingly,
the period remained unchanged in the European
Council decision drafted in anticipation of the
treaty’s ratification (see below). Put simply, six
months may not be a lot – particularly in the
second half of the year – but anything else would
be either too short or too long. (In a sort of per-
verted version of Churchill’s famous comment
on democracy, it could be argued that six months
is the worst length for a presidency – except all
the other lengths.)
4. The presidency still matters
Not only does the presidency still matter but
it could be argued that it is of increasing impor-
tance. Certainly, in the legislative sphere, the
Presidency has become increasingly important
because of the trend towards finding agreement
at the first reading stage of the co-decision pro-
cedure. These first reading agreements are
brokered, at the preparatory level, between the
chair of the Council working party and Parlia-
ment’s rapporteur and, at Coreper level by the
President of Coreper I. On more significant and
important legislative proposals, the brokerage
can be shared between successive Presidencies.
Clearly, the secretariats of the Council, the Par-
liament and the Commission play important
support roles in such negotiations, but the work-
ing party chairman and the parliamentary rap-
porteur’s roles are key, since they must then
‘sell’ the result of their informal negotiations
back, respectively, to their Council working
party or their parliamentary committee. (It is a
moot point as to how far such practices enhance
the transparency of the Union’s legislative proc-
esses, but that is another matter.) A very good
example of the presidency’s role in this context
was recently provided by Agence Europe (Bul-
letin Quotidien Europe 9392, 23 March 2007):
Great progress has been made in recent weeks in
Council talks on the draft directive on payment serv-
ices. On Wednesday, 21 March, EU member states’
representatives saw that a qualified majority of states
already agree on a draft compromise formulated by
the German Presidency but the details still have to
be examined in the member states in question. As
we went to press, the representatives were mandat-
ing the German Presidency to negotiate with the
European Parliament and the European Commission
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in three-way interinstitutional dialogue. The out-
come of the three-way talks will determine whether
the new directive can be adopted in first reading…
In a Union of 27, leadership is surely more
necessary than in a Community of six, nine or
twelve. Moreover, because of the very nature
of this particular form of leadership, the presi-
dency engenders trust among peers and this, in
turn, enables the Council to manage extremely
complex processes such as budgetary discus-
sions or calculations on qualified majorities.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favour of the
presidency, however, is that there is no obvious
alternative. Were the presidency to be done away
with, what would or could replace it? This is
not to say that the principle of rotation is set in
stone; at the moment, for example, eight of the
Council’s preparatory bodies have elected chairs
and seven are chaired by the Secretariat Gen-
eral. Nevertheless, the presidency is the pre-
ferred default option, and the absence of the
presidency would generate significant ineffi-
ciencies (which could be defined as the absence
of its advantages) and probably also significant
additional costs for the Council’s, and hence the
Union’s, budget.
Lastly, it is instructive to ask whether the
presidency is somehow ‘broken’. Is there, it
might be asked, a growing literature about fail-
ures and breakdowns in the Council’s machin-
ery due to the presidency? Has there been a re-
cent run of catastrophically-chaired Council
meetings? The answer to these rhetorical ques-
tions is clearly ‘no’. (Indeed, a number of ob-
servers and actors, including, perhaps most con-
spicuously, Günter Verheugen, argued strongly
that the success of the 8-9 March 2007 Euro-
pean Council provided graphic illustration of
the fact that the Presidency is still working well,
even in a Union of 27.)
Once they had dealt with the specific and
vital questions of the presidency of the Euro-
pean Council and the foreign minister, the sig-
natories to the Constitutional Treaty came to
much the same conclusion. Their response was
not to abandon the presidency but, rather, to con-
solidate its functioning through the creation of
an eighteen-month partnership between succes-
sive presidencies. En attendant the Constitu-
tional Treaty, the message seems clear: the presi-
dency ain’t broke; tinker, by all means, but
there’s nothing essential to fix!
5. A cherry picked?
However, with regard to the rotating presi-
dencies and the eighteen-month partnership, is
there, in fact any reason to attendre? Declara-
tion (number 4) attached to the Treaty estab-
lishing a Constitution for Europe on Article I-
24 (7) concerning the European Council deci-
sion on the exercise of the Presidency of the
Council declared that
the Council shall begin preparing the European de-
cision establishing the measures for applying the Eu-
ropean decision of the European Council on the ex-
ercise of the Presidency of the Council as soon as
the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is
signed and should give its political approval within
six months. A draft European decision of the Euro-
pean Council, which will be adopted on the date of
entry into force of the said Treaty, is set out below…
Clearly, the European Council decision to
create this mechanism, as provided for by arti-
cle I-24 (7), theoretically remains in limbo, like
the Constitutional Treaty itself. However, with
regard to enhancements to the rotating presi-
dency, the Council’s rules of procedure effec-
tively already implement much of the content
of the draft decision. Consider first the concept
of the eighteen-month presidency. The two para-
graphs of Article 1 of the draft European Coun-
cil decision provided that
1. The Presidency of the Council, with the excep-
tion of the Foreign Affairs configuration, shall be
held by pre-established groups of three Member
States for a period of 18 months. The groups shall
be made up on the basis of equal rotation among the
Member States, taking into account their diversity
and geographical balance within the Union.
2. Each member of the group shall in turn chair for
a six-month period all configurations of the Coun-
cil, with the exception of the Foreign Affairs con-
figuration. The other members of the group shall
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assist the Chair in all its responsibilities on the basis
of a common programme. Members of the team may
decide alternative arrangements among themselves.
Consider now that the second preamble to
the decision amending the rules of procedure,
adopted on 15th September 2006 (Council of the
European Union 2006), states that ‘(i)t is also
appropriate to streamline the programming of
the activities of the Council. Accordingly, a new
system based on an 18-month programme to be
submitted for endorsement to the Council by the
three Presidencies due to hold office during that
given period should be introduced and replace
the previous system.’ Article 2.4 further pro-
vides that
Every 18 months, the three Presidencies due to hold
office shall prepare, in close cooperation with the
Commission, and after appropriate consultations, a
draft programme of Council activities for that pe-
riod. The three Presidencies shall jointly submit the
draft programme no later than one month before the
relevant period, with a view to its endorsement by
the General Affairs and External Relations Council…
Article 2.5 elaborates further on this provi-
sion, and references to the 18-month period are
sprinkled throughout the rules (for example, Ar-
ticle 3.1 on agenda setting). The first of those
eighteen-month partnerships, involving Ger-
many, Portugal and Slovenia, is currently
underway; the next, involving France, the Czech
Republic and Sweden, will get under way in the
second half of 2008.
Article 20.2 further provides for the succeed-
ing presidency to assist the incumbent one, and
an annex to the rules (annex V) sets out a series
of provisions designed to facilitate the presiden-
cy’s work in an enlarged Council. In conclu-
sion, there is little left for the putative European
Council decision.
One other important consideration in the
Intergovernmental Conference’s thinking about
the eighteen-month presidency partnerships con-
cerned the large number of new member states
expected to join in 2004. Clearly, it would have
been undesirable for several new member states
to hold the presidency consecutively, and so the
idea was that the new member states would be
teamed up with (or ‘doughnutted’ by) older and
more experienced member states. In the mean-
time, Bulgaria and Romania have now joined
the Union, giving a grand total of twelve new
member states, including several smaller mem-
ber states. This was a consideration that could
not await the outcome of the protracted ratifica-
tion procedure for the Constitutional Treaty and
so, on 1 January 2007 (coinciding with the ac-
cession of Bulgaria and Romania), the Council
decision establishing the order of future presi-
dencies was amended (Council Decision of 1
January 2007) and the desired ‘doughnutting’
achieved: for example, Slovenia’s presidency
comes between that of Portugal and that of
France; the Czech Republic comes between
France and Sweden; and so on. Bulgaria and
Romania will not have to manage their first presi-
dencies until 2018 and 2019 respectively.
The clear conclusion is that, with regard to
the Constitutional Treaty’s provisions on the ro-
tating presidency, this is a cherry that has al-
ready been well and truly picked.
6. A little light heresy
When even the high priest of the Conven-
tion starts to advise on which cherries to pick
from the Constitutional Treaty, then it is prob-
ably fair to imagine that the current draft is un-
likely to survive as it is and that merer mortals
may dabble briefly in a little light heresy. What-
ever, it seems a fairly safe bet to imagine that
the provisions on the European Council perma-
nent presidency and the foreign affairs minister
will survive, and so it is instructive to examine
how those provisions would inter-relate with the
rotating presidency. Participants in both the
Convention and the Intergovernmental Confer-
ence were very much aware of the potential ten-
sions between the different presidencies that
would be brought into being.
The European Council President’s role and
tasks are set out in Article I-22. The European
Council would elect its President by qualified
majority for a two-and-a-half year term, renew-
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able once (how, the question arises, might this
five-year term be synchronised or staggered with
European Parliament elections and the term of
office of the European Commission?). The
President would chair the European Council and
‘drive forward’ its work. It would ensure the
preparation and continuity of the European
Council’s work, in cooperation with the Presi-
dent of the Commission and on the basis of the
work of the General Affairs Council. It would
endeavour to facilitate ‘cohesion and consen-
sus’ with the European Council and would re-
port to the European Parliament after each Eu-
ropean Council meeting. Finally
The President of the European Council shall, at his
or her level and in that capacity, ensure the external
representation of the Union on issues concerning its
common foreign and security policy without preju-
dice to the powers of the Union Minister for For-
eign Affairs.
Who might the first President of the Euro-
pean Council have been? Some of the names
tossed into the speculative hat, including Jean-
Claude Juncker and Tony Blair, give an idea of
the appropriate level. Nothing more nor less than
a former head of government would do: big
beasts, in other words, but not the only ones…
Under the provisions of the Constitutional
Treaty, the candidate for the President of the
European Commission would be proposed to
the European Parliament by the European Coun-
cil by qualified majority, after ‘taking into ac-
count the elections to the European Parliament’,
and would subsequently have to be approved
by an absolute majority of the European Parlia-
ment’s members. The Council would then, in
common accord with the President-elect, adopt
a list of ‘the other persons whom it proposes for
appointment as members of the Commission.’
And the thus-established college would then be
subject to a vote of consent by the European
Parliament. The Commission President would
thus enjoy a double legitimacy and, depending
on the outcome in European Parliament elec-
tions, could enjoy a powerful platform from
which to launch initiatives. Presumably, the now
well-established convention of putting forward
as candidates only former members of the Eu-
ropean Council would continue.
The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs
would be appointed by the European Council
by qualified majority but would be subject, to-
gether with the other members of the Commis-
sion college, to a vote of consent by the Euro-
pean Parliament. The thus appointed Union
Minister for Foreign Affairs would preside over
the Foreign Affairs Council but also be a Vice-
President of the European Commission.
The inter-relationship between these three
important and powerful positions, with their
varying degrees and forms of legitimacy, was
the subject of much debate during the Conven-
tion and thereafter. Moreover, to these forms of
legitimacy would be added other concerns such
as, for example, geographic balance. Thus a dec-
laration on Articles I-22, I-27 and I-28 annexed
to the draft constitutional treaty provided that
In choosing the persons called upon to hold the of-
fices of President of the European Council, Presi-
dent of the Commission and Union Minister for
Foreign Affairs, due account is to be taken of the
need to respect the geographical and demographic
diversity of the Union and its Member States. (ex-
tract from the declaration on Articles I-22, I-27 and
I-28 annexed to the Treaty Establishing a Constitu-
tion for Europe)
Those discussions will not be repeated here
(though it is instructive to ask, for example, how
the relationship between two former Prime Min-
isters – European Council and European Com-
mission – would pan out vis-à-vis the acting
Prime Minister whose member state held the
traditional presidency, and also, it should be
noted, vis-à-vis the President of the Euro Group
which, under the provisions of Protocol No. 12
annexed to the Treaty, would elect its own Presi-
dent for two-and-a-half year periods, by a sim-
ple majority of its members). Of more immedi-
ate interest is the possible inter-relationship be-
tween the three positions and the more ‘tradi-
tional’ rotating presidency which, it will be re-
called, would exist alongside them.
In the first place, the traditional presidency
would chair the General Affairs Council and,
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by extension (see Article 2 of the draft Euro-
pean Council decision below), Coreper. As seen
above, the President of the European Council
would be responsible for ensuring ‘the prepara-
tion and continuity of the European Council’s
work, in cooperation with the President of the
Commission and on the basis of the work of the
General Affairs Council’. The latter’s future
tasks were set out in Article 3 of the draft Euro-
pean Council decision:
The General Affairs Council shall ensure consist-
ency and continuity in the work of the different
Council configurations in the framework of
multiannual programmes in cooperation with the
Commission. The Member States holding the Presi-
dency shall take all necessary measures for the or-
ganisation and smooth operation of the Council’s
work, with the assistance of the General Secretariat
of the Council.
It is immediately apparent from this that the
relationship between the President of the Euro-
pean Council and the president-in-office of the
General Affairs Council would be key to the
success of the European Council.
In the second place, whilst the European
Council would, by qualified majority, establish
the list of ‘other Council configurations’, it
would fall to the General Affairs Council to en-
sure consistency in the work of those different
configurations, which would be presided over
by a ‘traditional’ president-in-office (though not
necessarily the same member state as the presi-
dent-in-office of the General Affairs Council):
Article 2
The Committee of Permanent Representatives of the
Governments of the Member States shall be chaired
by a representative of the Member State chairing
the General Affairs Council.
The chair of the preparatory bodies of the various
Council configurations, with the exception of the
Foreign Affairs configuration, shall fall to the mem-
ber of the group chairing the relevant configuration,
unless decided otherwise in accordance with Arti-
cle 4. (extract from the Treaty Establishing a Con-
stitution for Europe)
Once again, it is clear that the ‘traditional’
president-in-office of the General Affairs Coun-
cil would play a key role in ensuring coordina-
tion and continuity and in facilitating a smooth
relationship with the European Council.
In the third place, and notwithstanding the
provisions of Article I-28 (on the foreign min-
ister) and the draft European decision on the
exercise of the presidency, a delicate and prob-
ably constant process of demarcation will be
required between the role and responsibilities
of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, and
the Foreign Affairs Council, on the one hand,
and the other sectoral Councils and the tradi-
tional presidencies-in-office on the other. A
similar observation could be made about rela-
tions between the sectoral councils and the Eu-
ropean Council. The sort of policy issues cov-
ered by the 8-9 March 2007 European Council
gave a good illustration of the sort of demarca-
tion processes that could prove necessary. When,
for example, does energy policy become suffi-
ciently strategic to become a European Council
issue, rather than an issue for the Transport,
Telecommunications and Energy Council (go-
ing on the basis of current configurations)? The
same question could be posed with regard to
other issues covered such as social policy, or
better legislation.
In the fourth place, and implicit in the three
preceding observations, it is a moot point as to
how far the traditional presidencies would be
content to ‘disappear’ behind the permanent
presidency and the foreign minister and work
only to and for them.
Maybe a smaller member state would have
more modest concerns, but it is difficult to im-
agine one of the larger member states completely
foregoing its place in the sun. Moreover, the
desire to take visible initiatives in particular sec-
tors would perhaps be increased by the knowl-
edge that the possibility of taking such initia-
tives would only come once every fifteen years.
Clearly, such tendencies would not be incom-
patible with the centralised overall strategic role
envisaged for the European Council and its
President, but there would be a new imperative
for coordination and, in this context, the tradi-
tional presidency of the General Affairs Coun-
cil would play a vital role.
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7. The earnestness of being important
‘Anything,’ Goethe once declared, ‘can be
endured, except a succession of fine days.’ In-
tuitively, it could be expected that the rarity
value of exercising the traditional presidency
for each member state will have a general ef-
fect of raising the overall quality of presiden-
cies, particularly when combined with the new
coordination mechanisms described above. Put
in more negative terms, member states will
have a much greater interest in getting things
right and running a successful and well-coor-
dinated presidency for, if they don’t, it will take
them at least fifteen years to get a chance to
correct the record. Therein lies a possible risk
for the continued traditional arrangement – the
risk of over-preparation. Already, some old
hands in the Council can be heard grumbling
that some of the new member states are begin-
ning their preparations far too soon. Others,
though, see in this phenomenon the proof that
the traditional presidency matters and will con-
tinue to matter for the foreseeable future.
Therein lies the best guarantee of its continued
success and certainly a good illustration of its
continued importance.
In conclusion, therefore, the traditional ro-
tating presidency does matter and will continue
to matter. Far from dispensing with the rotating
presidency, the Constitutional Treaty would
have further consolidated its role and extended
it, particularly with regard to coordination. Since
those parts of the Constitutional Treaty concern-
ing the rotating presidency have already been
quietly anticipated through changes in the Coun-
cil’s rules of procedure and the remaining pro-
visions are likely to survive through into any
overall agreement, the rotating presidency will
continue to matter a great deal for the foresee-
able future – even if there were to be further
significant enlargements of the Union.
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